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Abstract
7KLVDUWLFOHH[SORUHVWKHGXDOXVHFRQFHSWE\IRFXVLQJRQWKHVSHFLÀFFDVHRIH[SRUWFRQWUROV
on cryptographic products. The analysis demonstrates different implementation models and 
interpretations adopted by states. Although adhering to the same multilateral export control 
regimes, states employ different approaches when it comes to implementation. The United 
6WDWHVDQGWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQDSSURDFKWRFU\SWRJUDSK\DUHXVHGDVFDVHVWXGLHVWRFRQÀUP
this hypothesis. This paper acknowledges the necessity of revisiting the dual-use concept over 
time as technology and understanding develop. 
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The Concept of Dual-Use in Practice
An analysis of politically and legally binding documents governing dual-use trade shows the 
ODFNRIDQ LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ OHJDOO\ELQGLQJGHÀQLWLRQRIGXDOXVH ([LVWLQJ LQVWUXPHQWVGHÀQH
the term in different ways, such as being linked to military capabilities, nuclear proliferation, 
covering the full spectrum of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), or even encompassing the 
human security approach to dual-use put forward by the European Parliament.2
If a common understanding of dual-use in politically and legally binding documents does not 
exist, then what do these instruments have in common? One answer may be that the lack of an 
1  Veronica Vella graduated in Global Politics, European Union, and Euro-Mediterranean Relations at the 
University of Catania (UC) and the University of Liège (ULg) - Double Master Degree Program. She has 




items that have resulted from bargaining and compromise over time. Consequently, lists, in addition 
to being the commonality of the different instruments employed to control dual-use commerce, 
have become the dual-use concept itself. In theory, since control lists are similar for all export 
control regime members, their understanding should be the same as well, and implementation 
should be uniform and smooth. However, the biggest distinction in the understanding of the dual-
use concept lies in the different export control systems employed by states. 
The following sections use the case study of cryptography to demonstrate whether a common 
understanding of dual-use exists from an empirical perspective. The case study aims to verify 
the conformity of lists governing dual-use trade and attest to a common understanding of dual-
use at the implementation level. 
Cryptography as a Dual-Use Technology
Cryptography is one of the most complex areas of the security industry. Increasingly, the issue 
of export controls on cryptographic products has been raised.3 Several factors, such as the 
growing international trade of information technology and services, companies’ increased 
interest in high-technology areas, and the centralized storage of personal and sensitive data and 
its transfer across digital networks have created a greater necessity for information security, 
whose key component is cryptography.4
&U\SWRJUDSK\LVGHÀQHGDV´WKHGLVFLSOLQHZKLFKHPERGLHVSULQFLSOHVPHDQVDQG
methods for the transformation of data in order to hide its information content, 
SUHYHQWLWVXQGHWHFWHGPRGLÀFDWLRQRUSUHYHQWLWVXQDXWKRUL]HGXVH&U\SWRJUDSK\LV
limited to the transformation of information using one or more ‘secret parameters’ 
(e.g., crypto variables) or associated key management.” 5 
3URGXFWV WKDW DUH GHVLJQHG RU PRGLÀHG WR XVH FU\SWRJUDSK\ HPSOR\LQJ GLJLWDO WHFKQLTXHV
performing a cryptographic function are ruled by encryption export controls. Most countries, 
to varying degrees, regulate encryption as a dual-use item, having both civilian and military 
applications. 
7KH8QLWHG6WDWHVZDV WKHÀUVW FRXQWU\ WRSLRQHHUHIIRUWV WR UHJXODWHHQFU\SWLRQGXULQJ WKH
Cold War.6 With the aim of harmonizing regulations on the export and import of dual-use 
3  Some examples include the case of J. Daniel Bernstein challenging the constitutional validity of the US 
export system; the struggle against encryption limitations held by international privacy advocates in 
political debates (such as the Electronic Privacy Information Centre the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
Privacy International, Cyber Rights & Cyber Liberties-UK, and the Global Internet Liberty Campaign); 
the DigitalEurope position on the EU-US Regulatory Cooperation; the issues raised by E. Snowden a 
couple of years ago; and more recently it has been questioned and reported in the press the possible 
role that cryptography has had in the Paris terrorist attacks (as if restricting encryption would not have 
prevented the them).
4  Nathan Saper, “International Cryptography Regulation and the Global Information Economy,” North 
Western Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 11:7 (2013), p. 673.
5  The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and 
Technologies, “List of Dual-use Goods and Technologies and Munitions list,” WA-LIST (16) 1, December 
8, 2016, p. 209.
6  Nathan Saper, “International Cryptography Regulation and the Global Information Economy,” North 
Western Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 11:7 (2013), p. 677.
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technologies, many countries have agreed to a set of principles, for example the Wassenaar 
Arrangement (WA).7 However, although the WA sets general parameters for import and export 
control to which its Member States largely adhere, they are not binding and are implemented 
at the discretion of each country. Thus, until Member States implement these provisions in 
national legislation, the controls have little effect.
Cryptography is fully regulated by one of the four main export control regimes and partially 
regulated in two others. The Australia Group (AG) Common Control Lists do not control 
cryptography, whereas the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Equipment, Software 
and Technology Annex refers to “decryption” in Category II Item 11, 
“Receiving Equipment for Global Navigation Satellite Systems” as “having any of 
the following characteristics, and specially designed components therefor: [...] 1. 
'HVLJQHGRUPRGLÀHGIRUDLUERUQHDSSOLFDWLRQVDQGKDYLQJDQ\RIWKHIROORZLQJ
>@(PSOR\LQJGHFU\SWLRQGHVLJQHGRUPRGLÀHGIRUPLOLWDU\RUJRYHUQPHQWDO
services, to gain access to GNSS secure signal/data [...].”
The Nuclear Suppliers Group’s (NSG) list of Nuclear-related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, 
Software, and Related Technology denotes cryptography in Part II under the heading “Uranium 
isotope separation equipment and components (Other Than Trigger List Items) - 3D Software.” 
,WVSHFLÀHVFU\SWRJUDSK\DV´VRIWZDUHRUHQFU\SWLRQNH\VFRGHVVSHFLDOO\GHVLJQHGWRHQKDQFH
or release the performance characteristics of equipment.” Further, the heading “Test and 
measurement equipment for the development of nuclear explosive devices, Software 5.D.1” 
mentions “Software or encryption keys/codes specially designed to enhance or release the 
performance characteristics of equipment not controlled in Item 5.B.3. so that it meets or 
H[FHHGVWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVVSHFLÀHGLQ,WHP%µ
Finally, the Wassenaar Arrangement controls cryptographic products as dual-use items under 
Category V, Part II of the “Information Security” section of its List of Dual-use Goods and 
Technologies and Munition List. The Cryptographic Information Security section states, 
´,QIRUPDWLRQ VHFXULW\ V\VWHPV HTXLSPHQW DQG FRPSRQHQWV DV IROORZV >@ 'HVLJQHG RU
PRGLÀHGWRXVHFU\SWRJUDSK\IRUGDWDFRQÀGHQWLDOLW\KDYLQJLQH[FHVVRIELWVRIV\PPHWULF
NH\OHQJWKRUHTXLYDOHQW«ZKHUHWKDWFU\SWRJUDSKLFFDSDELOLW\LVXVDEOHZLWKRXWFU\SWRJUDSKLF
activation or has been activated.” However, some exceptions have been established in the 
Cryptography Note and in the Note to the Cryptography Note.8
7  The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) succeeded the Co-ordinating Committee on Multilateral Export 
Controls (COCOM), which existed during the Cold War-era. It was established in 1994 in order to 
contribute to regional and international security and stability by promoting transparency and greater 
responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing 
destabilizing accumulations.
8  Note to the Cryptography Note: 1. To meet paragraph a of Note 3, all of the following must apply: (a) The 
item is of potential interest to a wide range of individuals and businesses; and (b) The price and information 
about the main functionality of the item are available before purchase without the need to consult the vendor 
or supplier. A simple price enquiry is not considered to be a consultation. 2. In determining eligibility 
of paragraph a. of Note 3, national authorities may take into account relevant factors such as quantity, 
price, required technical skill, existing sales channels, typical customers, typical use or any exclusionary 
practices of the supplier. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and 
Dual-use Goods and Technologies, “List of Dual-use Goods and Technologies and Munitions list,” WA-
LIST (16) 1, December 8, 2016, p. 87.
Different Approaches to Controlling Cryptography: The United States vs. The 
European Union
This section considers the EU and US implementation approach towards controlling 
cryptography. This comparison is a useful starting point for any investigation into the global 
framework for encryption regulation since the two countries have the most developed and 
documented laws regarding encryption.
United States
The United States is one of the global leaders in encryption technology and therefore has 
VLJQLÀFDQWLQÁXHQFHRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGHDQGSROLFLHVRQHQFU\SWLRQ$FFRUGLQJO\GHEDWHVRQ
encryption in the US have an impact far beyond national borders. 
US trade of dual-use items is regulated by the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) which implements its authority through the Export Administration Regulations 
(EAR).9 7KH($5GHÀQHV GXDOXVH DV LWHPV DV WKRVH ´>KDYLQJ@ FLYLO DSSOLFDWLRQV DVZHOO DV
terrorism and military or weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related applications.” 10 This 
GHÀQLWLRQ VHHPV WR UHÁHFW D ZLGHU 86 XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI GXDOXVH WKDW H[WHQGV EH\RQG WKH
traditional dichotomy of civilian versus military, including a terrorist dimension. 
As noted in 15 CFR 738, the Commerce Control List (CCL) of export controlled items 
covers ten categories ranging from nuclear materials to space vehicles. Within each category 
both export controlled physical objects and export controlled digital objects (software and 
´WHFKQRORJ\µ LH LQIRUPDWLRQ DUH FRQWUROOHG (QFU\SWLRQ LV FRYHUHG XQGHU &DWHJRU\ Ɍ
“Telecommunications and Information Security.” It is important to note that this particular 
HQWU\OLVWHGLQWKH&&/XQGHUDSDUWLFXODU([SRUW&RQWURO&ODVVLÀFDWLRQ1XPEHU(&&1PD\
be controlled for multiple reasons: encryption software and technology are marked as being 
controlled not only under the special “EI” Reason for Control but also under the more general 
“NS” (national security) and “AT” (anti-terrorism) Reasons for Control.11, 12 
Although the US is a WA member, it does not apply the General Software Note to “software” 
FRQWUROOHG E\&DWHJRU\Ɍ ² SDUWɉ ´,QIRUPDWLRQ6HFXULW\µ DQG JHQHUDOO\PDLQWDLQV VWULFWHU
controls than what is required by the arrangement.13, 14, 157KH86HPSOR\VWKHVDPHGHÀQLWLRQ
of cryptography as the WA yet takes a broad view of the scope of the encryption controls given 
  7KH($5LVSDUWRIWKH86&RGHRI)HGHUDO5HJXODWLRQV&)5PRUHVSHFLÀFDOO\WKH\DUHLQ7LWOHRI
the CFR, “Commerce and Foreign Trade,” Chapter VII, “Bureau of Export Administration, Department of 
Commerce (Parts 700-799),” Subchapter C, “Export Administration Regulations;” hence the EAR are also 
VRPHWLPHVUHIHUUHGWRDV&)5FKDSWHUɎVXEFKDSWHU&RU&)53DUWVSS
10  US Department of Commerce, “EAR – Part 730,” BIS, January 4, 2017, p. 2.
11  There is an “EI” Reason for Control applied just to encryption items.
12  US Department Of Commerce, “EAR – Part 738,” BIS, November 25, 2016.
13  General Software Note serves not to control “software” which is (1) generally available to the public, 
according certain criteria, (2) “in the public domain,” (3) the minimum necessary “object code” for the 
installation, operation, maintenance (checking) or repair of those items whose export has been authorized. 
14  US Department Of Commerce, “EAR – Part 774, The Commerce Control List,” BIS, September 20, 2016, 
p. 1.
15  Bert-Jaap Koops, “Crypto Law Survey, Overview per Country,” February 2013, <www.cryptolaw.org>.
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that it includes controls on products that make calls to the encryption functionality of a third 
party product, activation codes to activate “dormant” encryption functionality.16, 17
The US has been one of the most vocal advocates of restrictions on the right to use and export 
encryption, mainly driven by its prerogative to safeguard national security and foreign intelligence 
gathering capabilities, and increasingly by terrorist concerns. Initially, cryptographic products 
ZHUHFRQWUROOHGXQGHUWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDIÀFLQ$UPV5HJXODWLRQV,7$518 Considering the 
´FRPPRGLW\ MXULVGLFWLRQµ SURFHGXUH SURYLGHGE\ WKH ,7$5 D VSHFLÀF LWHPZDV FRQVLGHUHG
controlled depending on whether it came under the US Munitions List. If so, the item required 
a license before it could be exported. Munitions licenses were granted by the Department of 
State on a case by case basis. It was not until J. Daniel Bernstein challenged the constitutional 
validity of this licensing system that cryptographic export was transferred to the EAR, which 
essentially replicates the impugned ITAR controls on cryptographic technologies.19, 20 
The liberalization of US export policies started in 1998, when the Clinton administration 
announced a new policy to reform the strict export regime. However, during the reform process, 
the US also proposed domestic controls on the use of encryption which would enable law 
HQIRUFHPHQWRIÀFLDOVWROHJDOO\DFFHVVHQFU\SWLRQNH\VZKHQQHFHVVDU\21
The US has been a strong advocate of so-called “key escrow and key recovery systems” which 
involve third party access to private keys or the ability to access data in plain text. Such systems 
authorize a third party, such as government agency, or a Trusted Third Party, usually connected 
with the government, to store cryptographic keys and provide them to a government agency 
when requested.22 The US strongly pressured the international community to adopt this system. 
However, doing so provoked a strong reaction from international privacy advocates, security 
experts and civil liberties groups.23 The opponents of this system maintained that it would 
16  The discipline that embodies principles, means and methods for the transformation of data in order to hide its 
LQIRUPDWLRQFRQWHQWSUHYHQWLWVXQGHWHFWHGPRGLÀFDWLRQRUSUHYHQWLWVXQDXWKRUL]HGXVH́ &U\SWRJUDSK\µLV
limited to the transformation of information using one or more “secret parameters” (e.g., crypto variables) 
and/or associated key management. EAR- Part 772, p. 13. WA-LIST (16) 1, December 8, 2016, p. 209.
17  Jasper Helder, and John F. McKenzie, “Encryption Export Controls: A Comparative Analysis between the 





EAR regulate exports of commercial items with potential military applications (“dual-use” items).
19  The licensing scheme under ITAR violated his First Amendment right to free speech.
20  See for example Sarah Andrews, “Who Holds the Key? – A Comparative Study of US and European 
Encryption Policies,” The Journal of Information, Law and Technology (JILT) (February 2000), p. 8-9.
21  7KHÀUVWDWWHPSW WR UHVWULFWGRPHVWLFXVHFDPH LQZKHQ WKHJRYHUQPHQWGHYHORSHG WKH(VFURZHG
Encryption Standard Initiative aimed at providing citizens with a good level of security for communications 
while at the same time preventing transmission of data in total secrecy.
22  D. Maniotis, M.T. Marinos, A. Anthimos,  I. Iglezakis, and G. Nouskalis, Cyber Law in Greece (Netherlands: 
Kluwer Law International, 2011), p. 69.
23  For example, the Electronic Privacy Information Centre the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Privacy 
International, Cyber Rights & Cyber Liberties (UK), and the Global Internet Liberty Campaign.
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present a violation of the right to privacy, besides the fact that such systems are ineffective 
against criminals who merely use other encryption methods to avoid detection.24 Moreover, it 
LVLPSRUWDQWWRPHQWLRQWKDWLQWKH86WKHUHLVQRVSHFLÀFODZSURWHFWLQJWKHULJKWWRSULYDF\
of personal information. This area is ruled by a piecemeal collection of constitutional and 
statutory laws and self-imposed industry regulations.25
US export controls have been subject to a new wave of liberalization triggered by changes 
to the EU export regulations.26 As a consequence, a license exception was introduced for 
the export of any crypto product to any end-user in the EU. Export restrictions to terrorism 
supporting countries were maintained. In January 2011, a minor amendment was made to the 
EAR. Publicly available mass-market encryption object code software, and publicly available 
encryption object code of which the corresponding source code falls under License Exception 
TSU, are no longer subject to the EAR.27 
When exporting cryptographic products under the EAR, there are two important factors 
exporters must consider. First, the attributes of the software to be exported due to concern over 
NH\OHQJWK,QGHHG&DWHJRU\Ɍ3DUWɉRIWKH($5VSHFLÀHVWKDWHQFU\SWLRQV\VWHPVZLWKNH\
lengths of 56 bits or less for symmetric systems, or 512 bits or less for asymmetric systems, can 
be exported without restriction. Strong encryption systems, which use longer keys, face export 
restrictions.28 Moreover, there is an exemption for “mass market” encryption products, according 
to which if an encryption product is generally available to the public, for home or personal use, 
without continuing support by the supplier (e.g., a personal email security program), then its 
H[SRUWLVQRWUHVWULFWHG$ÀQDOLPSRUWDQWH[HPSWLRQLVIRUSURGXFWV´ZKHQDFFRPSDQ\LQJWKHLU
XVHUIRUWKHXVHU·VSHUVRQDOXVHRUDVWRROVRIWKHWUDGH>«@µWKLVDOORZVXVHUVWRIRUH[DPSOH
travel with laptops and mobile phones that contain encryption capabilities.29 
In addition, exporters must consider to whom the software is being sold, thus including the 
VSHFLÀFDWWULEXWHVRIWKHFXVWRPHU·VORFDWLRQZKLFKFDQEHSUREOHPDWLF,QGHHGWKHH[SRUWHU
must indicate and ensure that their customers are neither located in an embargoed country nor 
are “Specially Designated Nationals.” 30 However, contrary to other countries’ export control 
regimes, the EAR makes no distinction between the physical shipment of tangible items from 
the US to a foreign country and the electronic transmission of software or technology from 
24  Sarah Andrews, “Who Holds the Key? – A Comparative Study of US and European Encryption Policies,” 
The Journal of Information, Law and Technology (JILT) (February 2000), p. 4.
25  Ibid, 14.
26  Bert-Jaap Koops, “Crypto Law Survey, Overview per Country,” February 2013, <www.cryptolaw.org>. 
27  Ibid.
28  U.S. Department Of Commerce, “EAR – Category 5 Part 2, “Information Security,” BIS, September 20, 2016.
29  Nathan Saper, “International Cryptography Regulation and the Global Information Economy,” North 
Western Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 11:7 (2013), p. 680-681.
30  7KH2IÀFHRI)RUHLJQ$VVHWV&RQWURO2)$&DQDJHQF\ZLWKLQWKH867UHDVXU\'HSDUWPHQWDGPLQLVWHUV
VDQFWLRQVSURJUDPVDJDLQVWVSHFLÀFFRXQWULHVUHVWULFWLQJWKHH[SRUWRIVHQVLWLYHSURGXFWVDQGPDWHULDOV³
including cryptography software—to those locations. In addition, OFAC administers restrictions against 
exports to specially designated individuals and entities, known as “Specially Designated Nationals” 
(“SDNs”); exports to those individuals and entities are generally prohibited.
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the US to a person or entity located abroad.31 For export control purposes, any such physical 
shipment or electronic transmission is an export that must be performed in accordance with 
the requirements and restrictions embodied in the EAR. Thus, section 734.2(b)(1) of the EAR 
GHÀQHVWKHWHUPH[SRUWWRLQFOXGHDQ\´DFWXDOVKLSPHQWRUWUDQVPLVVLRQRILWHPVVXEMHFWWRWKH
($5RXWRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVµ$OOWKLVSURYHVWREHSUREOHPDWLFZKHQÀUPVWKDWVHOOHQFU\SWLRQ
software over the internet must adopt measures to screen their customers to assure their location, 
DQGLWLV\HWXQFOHDUZKDWNLQGVRIVWHSVVXFKÀUPVFDQWDNHWRHQVXUHFRPSOLDQFH32 
Although its export control system is based on its commitments under multilateral export 
control regimes, “the US also maintains unilateral controls on a wide range of dual-use items 
predominantly for anti-terrorism reasons.” 33 The US maintains certain “anti-terrorism export 
FRQWUROVµRQWKRVHHQFU\SWLRQSURGXFWVWKDWDUHH[FOXGHGIURPFRQWUROV6SHFLÀFDOO\HQFU\SWLRQ
SURGXFWVWKDWDUHVXEMHFWWRH[SRUWFRQWUROVDUHJHQHUDOO\FODVVLÀHGXQGHU$KDUGZDUHDQG
5D002 (software). Export licenses or other authorizations (such as export license exceptions) 
are required in order to export those 5A002 and 5D002 encryption products from the US. 
However, there are certain products with encryption functions and features that are excluded 
from the controlled categories.34 Those excluded products are subject to certain “anti-terrorism” 
export controls. In the encryption provisions of the US CCL, encryption products that are 
H[FOXGHGIURP$KDUGZDUHDQG'VRIWZDUHDUHFODVVLÀHGIRU86H[SRUWFRQWURO
purposes under 5A992 (hardware) and 5D992 (software).35 Those entries on the CCL indicate 
WKDWSURGXFWVFODVVLÀHGXQGHUWKRVH$DQG'FDWHJRULHVDUHFRQWUROOHGIRU´$7µRU
anti-terrorism) purposes.36 Therefore, under both the US Commerce Country Chart and the 
anti-terrorism provisions of Part 742 of the EAR, the products that are subject to those AT 
export controls are restricted for export to those countries that have been designated by the 




used for both civil and military purposes, and shall include all goods which can be used for both 
31  John F., McKenzie, “United States Export Controls on Internet Software Transactions,” Baker & McKenzie, 
August 2010, p. 3.
32  Nathan Saper, “International Cryptography Regulation and the Global Information Economy,” North 
Western Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 11:7 (2013), p. 681.
33  2IÀFH RI WKH &RRUGLQDWRU IRU &RXQWHUWHUURULVP 7KH *OREDO &KDOOHQJH RI &KHPLFDO %LRORJLFDO
Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism, 2011, <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224827.htm>.
34  Examples of those excluded products include (i) products that use a very weak encryption algorithm only 
(e.g., a symmetric encryption algorithm with a key length of 56 bits or less); (ii) products that qualify as 
“mass market” encryption items; and (iii) products that use encryption exclusively for authentication, 
password protection or other forms of access control to digital resources, but do not provide any data 
encryption functionality
35  US Department of Commerce, “EAR – Category 5 Part 2 - Information Security,” BIS, September 20, 2016.
36  US Department of Commerce, “EAR – Part 742, Control Policy - CCL Based Controls,” BIS, January 2017.
37  US Department of Commerce, “EAR - Supplement No. 1 to Part 738 – Commerce Country Chart,” 
BIS, November 4, 2016; US Department of Commerce, “EAR – Part 742, Control Policy - CCL Based 
Controls,” BIS, January 15, 2017.
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non-explosive uses and assisting in any way in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices.” 387KLVGHÀQLWLRQFXPXODWHV´SXUSRVLYHµXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKLVWHUP
EHFDXVHLWÀUVWUHIHUVWRPLOLWDU\DQGQRQPLOLWDU\SXUSRVHV:$$*07&5GHÀQLWLRQVDQG
WKHQUHIHUVWRQXFOHDUDQGQRQQXFOHDUSXUSRVHV16*GHÀQLWLRQLQFOXGLQJQXFOHDUWHUURULVP39 
However, especially after the Arab Spring began in 2010, and considering the deep instability 
of the African continent and the Middle East, the concern of dual-use trade has expanded in the 
EU towards a concern for human rights in the export control context. By way of illustration, 
the European Parliament (EP) proposed a legislative resolution in 2012 to extend the scope of 
dual-use.40 Debates on this particular issue, mainly linked to dual-use technologies, are still 
ongoing as part of the review of the Regulation. Members of the EP as well as members of the 
Commission call for “taking into consideration human rights as a new dimension of export 
controls,” suggesting establishing human rights as a reason for control and possibly denial of 
export.41 These debates arose after the discovery that during the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, 
information and communication technologies provided by European companies played a role 
in aiding and assisting the government’s violation of the freedom of expression, freedom of 
press and access to information.42 
The recent European Commission proposal to amend Council Regulation No. 428/2009 has 
introduced the issue of preventing human rights violation associated with certain cyber-
surveillance technology.43 7KH SURSRVDO DGGV WR WKH GHÀQLWLRQ RI GXDOXVH LQ$UWLFOH ɉ D
paragraph as follows, 
“ Cyber-surveillance technology which can be used for the commission of serious 
violations of human rights or international humanitarian law, or can pose a 
threat to international security or the essential security interests of the Union and 
its Member States.” 44 
$VIDUDVFU\SWRJUDSK\LVFRQFHUQHGJHQHUDOO\(80HPEHU6WDWHVDUHXQLÀHGLQWKHLUFRPPLWPHQW
to a liberal framework for encryption regulations, even though there has not yet been formal 
38  Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 Setting up a Community Regime for the Control 
RI([SRUWV7UDQVIHU%URNHULQJDQG7UDQVLWRI'XDOXVH,WHPV2IÀFLDO-RXUQDORIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ/
134/1) of May 29, 2009.
39  Quentin Michel, Sylvian Paile, Maryna Tsukanova and Andrea Viski, Controlling the Trade of Dual-Use 
Goods - A Handbook, (Brussels, Peter Lang, 2013) p. 81.




42 “ Inquiry into Role of European Companies in Violation of Human Rights,” European Parliament, March 9, 2011, 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2011-002212&language=SL>.
43  EU Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Setting Up a 





harmonization of encryption policies among them.45 The export control laws of Member States 
regarding encryption products are uniformly regulated under European law, although each state 
may have additional regulations concerning the import, supply, use or export of encryption items.
At present, the governing legislation is the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2420 
of October 2015 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/200.46 Before this amendment, 
the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 1382/2014 of October 2014 replaced and 
XSGDWHGWKH(8FRQWUROOLVWWRUHÁHFWGHFLVLRQVWDNHLQH[SRUWFRQWUROUHJLPHVLQDQG
2013.47 The update incorporated some 400 changes, including the addition of new controls, the 
removal of some controls, changes to certain technical parameters and other amendments.48 
$PRQJWKHPRVWVLJQLÀFDQWFKDQJHVLV WKHLQFOXVLRQRIDQDGGLWLRQDO´QRWH WRFU\SWRJUDSK\
note” in order to be in line with the WA and other international agreements.49 
In addition, the EU has adopted a General Technology Note and a General Software Note 
that excludes information and software within the public domain from the Control List. 
&U\SWRJUDSK\DQGLQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\SURGXFWVDUHLQFOXGHGLQ$QQH[ɈRIWKHFRQWUROOLVWDQG
are subject to a licensing regime as regard exports from the European Union. 
Similarly to the US, the EU takes a broad view of the scope of encryption controls. Indeed, it also 
includes activation codes to activate “dormant” encryption functionality, but unlike the US, it 
has always controlled components for “mass market” encryption items.50 However, encryption 
SURGXFWVVSHFLDOO\GHVLJQHGRUPRGLÀHGIRUPLOLWDU\XVHDUHVXEMHFW WRH[SRUWFRQWUROXQGHU
national regulations of EU Member States with respect to military items. 
7KHPRVWVLJQLÀFDQWGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ(8DQG86HQFU\SWLRQH[SRUWFRQWUROV OLHV LQ WKHLU
UHVSHFWLYHFODULW\LQGHÀQLQJZKDWLVDQGZKDWLVQRWFRQWUROOHG,QGHHGJHQHUDOO\(8FRQWUROV
are very clear whether an item is to be controlled or not and there is no equivalent to US anti-
terrorism controls on an EU level even if some Member States can introduce national controls 
beyond the EU Regulation.51, 52 Nonetheless, if the US employs the “exceptionalism” of anti-
WHUURULVP WKH(8DSSOLHV WKH´H[FHSWLRQDOLVPµRIKXPDQULJKWV ,Q WKLV UHJDUG$UWLFOHɏ
RIWKH(85HJXODWLRQFODULÀHVWKDW´D0HPEHU6WDWHPD\SURKLELWRULPSRVHDQDXWKRUL]DWLRQ
45  Sarah Andrews, “Who Holds the Key? – A Comparative Study of US and European Encryption Policies,” 
The Journal of Information, Law and Technology (JILT), February 2000, p. 13.
46  European Commission Delegated Regulation No. 2420/2015 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 
428/2009 Setting up a Community Regime for the Control of Exports, Transfer, Brokering and Transit of 
'XDOXVH,WHPV2IÀFLDO-RXUQDORIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ2FWREHU
47  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 1382/2014 of 22 October 2014 Amending Council Regulation 




50  Jasper Helder and John F. McKenzie, “Encryption Export Controls: a Comparative Analysis between the EU 
and the US,” Annual International Trade Compliance Conference, Netherlands: November 8, 2013, p. 18.
51  There is no equivalent to US anti-terrorism controls such as 5A992, 5D992, 5E992.
52  Jasper Helder and John F. McKenzie, “Encryption Export Controls: a Comparative Analysis between the EU 
and the US,” Annual International Trade Compliance Conference, Netherlands: November 8, 2013, p. 22.
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UHTXLUHPHQWRQWKHH[SRUWRIGXDOXVHLWHPVQRWOLVWHGLQ$QQH[ɈIRUUHDVRQVRISXEOLFVHFXULW\
or human rights consideration.” 53
Indeed, as far as cryptography is concerned, many EU licensing authorities consider encryption 
for governmental use to be a potential human rights issue. A few examples of encryption related 
human rights impact are, for example: (1) German unilateral controls for certain hardware 
and software for Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TTR) for Sudan, (2) increased scrutiny by Dutch 
authorities of encryption exports to Lebanon, (3) the exception for the supply of certain 
encryption items to Iran under EU sanctions, (4) Netherlands brokering controls requiring 
LQGLYLGXDO SUHQRWLÀFDWLRQ RI EURNHULQJ IRU WKH VXSSO\ RI FRQWUROOHG LWHPV IRU ´VHQVLWLYH
countries,” and (5) UK license refusals for encryption communications equipment. 54, 55
The UK presents an exception to the overall EU approach towards this issue. Indeed, the UK 
KDVVSHFLÀFUHTXLUHPHQWVUHODWLQJWRWKHH[SRUWRIFHUWDLQFU\SWRJUDSKLFLWHPVZKHQH[SRUWHG
from the UK under a EU General Export Authorization (GEA). These requirements consist in 
providing “details of information, which is in a person’s possession, or other information as 
that person can be reasonable be expected to obtain.” 56 Such information should be submitted 
WRWKH8.([SRUW&RQWURO2UJDQL]DWLRQ(&2YLDHPDLOZLWKLQGD\VRIÀUVWH[SRUW
Overall, despite the EU common framework, Member States implement encryption controls 
differently and still have dissimilar national laws in some cases.57 The EU approach towards 
FU\SWRJUDSK\UHÁHFWVLWVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIGXDOXVHDVDOVRUHODWHGWRKXPDQULJKWVYLRODWLRQV
in this regard. Moreover, the EU does not have equivalent to US anti-terrorism controls such 
as 5A992, 5D992, 5E992. Indeed, “anti-terrorism export controls” has proved to be a unique 
feature of US implementation.
What about ‘International Competitiveness’? 
As shown above, the EU and US approach towards cryptography, and more generally to the dual-
use concept, is not the same, nor does it seems to be coherent. These different understandings may 
damage inter alia international competitiveness. In this regard, and as a further demonstration 
of the inconsistency of these two approaches, it is useful to mention the point of view of 
an important stakeholder, namely DigitalEurope, a European organization that represents the 
digital technology industry and seeks to ensure industry participation in the development and 
implementation of EU policies.58 In the framework of the much-discussed Transatlantic Trade 
53  Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 Setting up a Community Regime for the Control 
RI([SRUWV7UDQVIHU%URNHULQJDQG7UDQVLWRI'XDOXVH,WHPV2IÀFLDO-RXUQDORIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ/
134/1) of May 29, 2009.
54  Afghanistan, Angola, Belarus, Burma, Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Guinea, India, Iraq, Iran, Israel Ivory Coast, 
Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, North-Korea, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria, Zimbabwe, South Sudan.
55  Jasper Helder and John F. McKenzie, “Encryption Export Controls: a Comparative Analysis between the EU 
and the US,” Annual International Trade Compliance Conference, Netherlands: November 8, 2013, p. 24.
56 “ Additional UK Requirements for Cryptography Items Exported under an EU GEA,” EU General Export 
Authorizations, <https://www.gov.uk/european-union-general-export-authorisations>.
57  See Figure 2 in Annex II. 
58  “About Us,” DigitalEurope, <http://www.digitaleurope.org/Aboutus.aspx>.
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and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US, DigitalEurope addresses a 
paper containing its comments and suggestions about it. 
The organization underlines the divergent policy approaches adopted by the EU and the US 
towards the ICT industry. The two systems demonstrate differences in their regulatory systems 
and in their approaches to risk management, making the achievement of a certain level of 
KDUPRQL]DWLRQGLIÀFXOW(YHQZKHQSULQFLSDOUHJXODWRU\REMHFWLYHVDUHHTXLYDOHQWLQSUDFWLFH
product requirements imposed by the EU and US technical regulations in certain cases diverge.59 
Indeed, given that the ICT industry generally operates on a global scale, dissimilarities in 
standard requirements involve the implementation of more than one standard for the same 
functionality, and hence lead to duplicated implementation efforts and costs. DigitalEurope 
PHPEHUVRIIHUSURGXFWVVXFKDVKDUGZDUHRUVRIWZDUHZLWKFU\SWRJUDSKLFFDSDELOLWLHVFODVVLÀHG
as dual-use items. It argues that EU and US export control regulations require that every export 
of dual-use item shall be performed according these regulations, which envisage either an 
export authorization/license or a license exception. Nevertheless, because the implementation 
of export controls is a national responsibility, the administrative procedures for compliance and 
the method for controlling dual-use items differ between the controlling countries.60 Hence a 
problem arises of damaged international competitiveness. 
The latter may be further proved by glancing at other countries’ approaches to cryptography. 
)LJXUHɉLQ$QQH[ɉSURYLGHVDJHQHUDOYLHZRILQWHUQDWLRQDOHQJDJHPHQWVWRZDUGVLPSRUWDQG
export controls, and domestic law and regulations on crypto use.61 If on the one hand nothing 
QHZHPHUJHVIURPWKLVÀJXUHVLQFHWKHZHDNQHVVHVRIGXDOXVHH[SRUWFRQWUROV³LH the lack 
of uniformity in implementation and even acceptance of these systems by states—are well 
known), on the other hand it suggests that a strong dual-use export control system is needed 
worldwide in order to be effective and assure competitiveness and security. 
China is one of the most challenging environments for cryptography use and regulations.62 Both 
LPSRUWDQGH[SRUWRIFU\SWRJUDSKLFSURGXFWVDUHKLJKO\UHJXODWHGDQGVSHFLÀFDOO\HQFU\SWLRQ
is regulated by the National Commission on Encryption Code Regulations (NCECR).63 
Encryption products cannot be sold or imported in China without prior approval by NCECR, 
DQG LQGLYLGXDOV DQG ÀUPV FDQ RQO\ XVH FU\SWRJUDSKLF SURGXFWV DSSURYHG E\1&(&57KLV
UHVWULFWLRQDOVRDSSOLHVWRIRUHLJQLQGLYLGXDOVDQGÀUPVRSHUDWLQJLQ&KLQDDVWKH\PXVWUHFHLYH
approval to use their encryption systems. China is not a member of the WA, which means WA 
Member States are not allowed to export chip technology to China. 
Unlike in the US and the EU, all encryption products in China, regardless of key strength or 
other factors, are fully regulated.64 Nevertheless, importing encryption products and equipment 
59  “Digitaleurope Position on the EU-US Regulatory Cooperation,” Digital Europe, November 5, 2013, 
Brussels, p. 1.
60  Ibid, 15.
61  However, it is important to note that it is updated to 2013.
62  Nathan Saper, “International Cryptography Regulation and the Global Information Economy,” North 
Western Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 11:7 (2013), p. 683.
63  Article 4 of Shangyong Mima Guanli Tiaoli (࠱ѓ઼܉ڷԑֺຎ), “Regulation of Commercial Encryption 
Codes,” State Council, Directive No. 273, Oct. 7, 1999, China, <http://newmedia.cityu.edu.hk/cyberlaw/
gp3/pdf/law_encryption.pdf>. 
64  Ibid.
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containing encryption technology is restricted in China because of the focus on protecting 
information security, strengthening commercial encryption management, and safeguarding 
national security interests.65 China has pursued a policy of favoring the development of 
domestic cryptography systems, for example with the creation of a new Chinese standard for 
wireless Wi-Fi security (WAPI). This kind of approach could be damaging to international 
FRPSHWLWLYHQHVVVLQFHIRUHLJQFRPSDQLHVKRSLQJWRVHOOZLÀGHYLFHVWR&KLQDZRXOGKDYHWR
FRSURGXFHWKHLUSURGXFWZLWKGHVLJQDWHG&KLQHVHÀUPV66 
Furthermore, the WAPI standard raises fear that the domestic cryptography standard would 
create a functional key escrow system that would allow the Chinese Government easier access 
to encrypted communications. More recently, China’s legislature approved an anti-terrorism 
law which requires companies to hand over technical information and help with decryption 
when the police or state security agents demand it for investigating or preventing terrorist 
cases.67 This provision has created concern among human rights groups about the Chinese 
government’s increasingly intrusive powers and has also created a warning for international 
companies that use encrypted technology in China such as Cisco, IBM and Apple, all of which 
have big stakes there.
Interestingly, multinationals are not the only advocates of more relaxed provisions concerning 
encryption. The Dutch government, for example, published a position paper in which it 
“endorses the importance of strong encryption for internet security, for supporting the protection 
RIFLWL]HQV·SULYDF\IRUFRQÀGHQWLDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQE\WKHJRYHUQPHQWDQGFRPSDQLHVDQGIRU
the Dutch economy.” 68 The paper also states that 
“ The ability to use encryption strengthens the international competitiveness of the 
Netherlands, and promotes an attractive climate for businesses and innovation 
[…]. Trust in secure communication and storage of data is essential for the 
(future) growing potential of the Dutch economy, that mainly resides in the digital 
economy.” 
Although the same technology is an obstacle in legitimate investigations, the Dutch paper 
calls for a “search for new solutions” and opposes the introduction of backdoors in encryption 
products. Similarly, the French government has rejected crypto backdoors as “the wrong 
solution.” The Deputy Minister for Digital Affairs Axelle Lemaire, speaking on behalf of the 
French government, rejected an amendment to the new “Law for the Digital Republic,” calling 
for computer companies to provide backdoors to encrypted systems.69
65  Yu, Xia and Murphy, Mattew (MMlC Group), “The Regulation of Encryption Products in China,” 
%ORRPEHUJ/DZ5HSRUWV²$VLD3DFLÀF4:2 (2011), p. 1.
66  This clearly suggests a protectionist tool used by Chinese government to promote domestic technology 
production.
67  Chris Buckley, “China Passes Anti-terrorism Law That Critics Fear May Overreach,” The New York Times, 
December 27, 2015, <https://nyti.ms/1ZvqB5L>. 
68  G.A. van der Steur, Minister van Veiligheid en Justitie, H.G.J. Kamp, Minister van Economische Zaken, 
Brief regering, January 4, 2016. 
69  Glyn Moody, “French Government Rejects Crypto Backdoors as the Wrong Solution,” Ars Technica, 
January 14, 2016, <https://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2016/01/french-government-rejects-crypto-
backdoors-as-the-wrong-solution/>.
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7RFRQFOXGH LQ WKH VSHFLÀFFDVHRIFU\SWRJUDSK\YDU\LQJ UHJXODWLRQVDQG LPSOHPHQWDWLRQV
ZRUOGZLGHDUHFRQVLGHUDEOHREVWDFOHVWRLQIRUPDWLRQWHFKQRORJ\DQGVHFXULW\ÀUPV·ZLOOLQJQHVV
WR H[SDQG LQWR QHZ PDUNHWV 7KHUHIRUH PXOWLQDWLRQDO ÀUPV PD\ VXIIHU IURP WKLV ODFN RI
understanding at the international level.70 At the same time, the right to privacy is at stake since 
the only way to protect the privacy of digital information is by encryption. 
,VD1HZ'HÀQLWLRQ1HFHVVDU\"
This article has argued for a common understanding of the dual-use concept. In this regard, 
RQHPD\ZRQGHULIWKHDGRSWLRQRIDQHZJOREDOGHÀQLWLRQPD\EHDIXQGDPHQWDOFRQGLWLRQ
to achieve this purpose. Yet, this leads to another question in turn: If export control regime 
guidelines set the standards for national export controls, are they uniformly implemented 
by Member States? As this article has shown, they are not. Beyond this, catch-all clauses or 
different perceptions of a dual-use item, as in the case of cryptography, suggest it is not just a 
matter of standards. By analogy, the same reasoning may be applied to justify the uselessness of 
DQHZFRPPRQGHÀQLWLRQRIGXDOXVH7KHUHLVQRURRPWRWKLQNWKDWDQHZGHÀQLWLRQZLOOOHDG
to a homogeneous and global implementation of dual-use export controls. Inevitably, different 
interpretations, investigation and enforcement structures, borderline cases, end-user concerns, 
and levels of information or intelligence among states lead to different export control decisions. 
+RZHYHULIRQWKHRQHKDQGWKHDGRSWLRQRIDQHZGHÀQLWLRQLVIDUIURPEHLQJWKHVROXWLRQWRWKH
current weak international export control system, on the other hand it may be valid and useful 
WRSURSRVHDPRGHUQDQGFRQVLVWHQWGHÀQLWLRQWKDW LQFRUSRUDWHVWKHGLIIHUHQWXQGHUVWDQGLQJV
RIWKHFRQFHSWDQGUHÁHFWVWKHHYROXWLRQLWKDVXQGHUJRQH$Q\QHZGHÀQLWLRQSURSRVDOVKRXOG
clearly touch on the following: (1) which “items” are to be controlled, (2) which purposive 
nature, and (3) which scope/security. 
For instance, considering the subcategory “items,” and the confused way in which they are 
XVHGE\GLIIHUHQWLQVWUXPHQWVVHH$QQH[ɈGXDOXVHPD\UHIHUWR´LWHPµLQWKHVHQVHRIJRRGV
including software and technologies. Moreover, to consider the dual-use concept in the life-
sciences, “items” should also refer to “information.” However, information should not be 
interpreted in the sensu stricto of “technology,” which many lists already refer to. Rather, it 
should be meant as the information issues related to dual-use arising from research.
In addition, in light of the multiplication of items with uncertain dual-use features (due also to 
the increasingly blurry lines between civilian and defense technology and industrial bases), and 
with the multiplication of dual-use items with no predominately military use (e.g., surveillance 
technology, encryption), a question remains concerning the traditional dichotomy between 
civil vs. military.
Finally, in view of the dissimilar scopes of several international instruments governing dual-use 
FRPPHUFHVHH$QQH[ɈDYDOXDEOHVFRSHWRLQFOXGHLQWKHQHZGHÀQLWLRQPD\EH´peaceful 
and non-peaceful” in order to comprehend the purpose of every instrument. However, this 
XPEUHOOD GHÀQLWLRQ DSSURDFK ZRXOG QRW WDNH LQWR DFFRXQW WKH VKLIW IURP QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\
interests to human security interests since the concept of peaceful vs. non-peaceful originates 
70  In this regard, the DigitalEurope position on the EU-US regulatory cooperation is illustrative.
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in the international concept of war and peace. Therefore, given that, (1) the concept of dual-
use seems to have shifted from state’s concern for security to consideration also of human 
security (e.g., the EU understanding of dual-use as related to human rights violation; the US 
understanding of dual-use as related to terrorism), (2) taking into account the dual-use research 
of concern area, (3) and the case of cryptography which underlines the possible threats to 
KXPDQULJKWVWRSULYDF\WKHUHIRUHWRSROLWLFDOVHFXULW\WKHGHÀQLWLRQPD\UHIHUWRLWHPVZKLFK
threaten human security, used as umbrella concept that includes political security. These are 
suggestions which aim to open the way for further studies in this direction.
Conclusion
This investigation of legally and politically binding instruments referring to the dual-use concept 
KDVGHPRQVWUDWHGWKHODFNRIDFRPPRQGHÀQLWLRQDQGLGHQWLÀHGDQGFRPSDUHGVLPLODULWLHVDQG
differences in national understandings of dual-use. The article has analyzed to what extent the 
international community has confusingly worded the concept of dual-use. 
2QHRI WKHPRVW VLJQLÀFDQWÀQGLQJV LV WKDW WKH FRQFHSWRIGXDOXVHKDV HYROYHG IURPVWDWH
proliferation concerns to encompass also non-state proliferation concerns, thus shifting from 
national security interests to human security interests. In this regard, the US and EU approach 
are empirical evidence. On the one hand, the US maintains unilateral controls on a wide range of 
dual-use items predominantly for anti-terrorism reasons, such as anti-terrorism export controls 
on 5A992 and 5D992 categories, to which there is no EU equivalent. On the other hand, the 
(8KDVVKRZQDKXPDQULJKWVDSSURDFKWRWKHGXDOXVHFRQFHSWE\DSSHDOLQJWR$UWLFOHɏ
of the EU Dual-Use Regulation and maintaining ongoing dialogue through regulatory reform 
discussions within the EU. Although the EU and the US adhere to the same multilateral export 
FRQWURO UHJLPHVDQGKDYHD ORW LQ FRPPRQ LH GHÀQLQJGXDOXVHDVKDYLQJERWKFLYLO DQG
military applications), they employ different approaches when it comes to implementation. 
The common denominator for all export controls regimes consists of lists of dual-use items. 
Nevertheless, the consideration of the case of cryptography has revealed a lack of conformity 
among these international instruments. This, however, does not imply that lists are not the most 
practical way to achieve common and objective guidance.
Besides the harmonization of lists and systems, a reconceptualization of dual-use may be useful. 
7KHUHLVDQHHGIRUDPRGHUQDQGFRQVLVWHQWGHÀQLWLRQWRLQFRUSRUDWHWKHGLIIHUHQWXQGHUVWDQGLQJV
RIWKHFRQFHSWDQGWRUHÁHFWWKHHYROXWLRQLWKDVXQGHUJRQHDVWHFKQRORJ\DQGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQV




Figure 1: Matrix of the terms used to refer to dual-use, articulated  
     in the 3 subcategories of items, and the scope of each instrument.7172
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including software and technology, 
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compulsorily 
“necessary”—to be used 
for such purposes, which 
enlarges the possibilities 
of control).
6DPHGHÀQLWLRQRI
NSG – Annex I.
General Software 
Note (GSN).
Cumulates WA, AG, 
MTCR and NSG 
objectives. 
Effort to extend the 
original scope to 
protection of human 
rights and democratic 
principles, to torture or 
other cruel inhuman or 







The term ‘dual- use’ is often  
used to describe the types of  
items subject to the EAR. A ‘dual-use’ 
item is one that has civil applications 
 as well as terrorism and military or 
weapons of mass destruction  
(WMD)-related applications.76
The term goods is not used. However, 
an item means “commodities, software, 
and technology.” 77 The term commodity 
LVGHÀQHGDV´DQ\DUWLFOHPDWHULDO 
 or supply except technology and 
software.” (An item shall be reviewed 
with the light of the Commerce  
Control List and the provisions  
of the Regulations.) 
´%DVLF6FLHQWLÀF
Research.”
(GTN) – “Experimental 
or theoretical work 
undertaken principally to 
acquire new knowledge  
of the fundamental 
principles of phenomena 
or observable facts, not 













“Initially used to refer to the aspects of 
certain materials, information and 
technologies that are useful in both 
military and civilian spheres. The 
expression is increasingly being used to 
refer not only to military and civilian 
purposes, but also to harmful misuse 
and peaceful activities.”
From military and 
civilian sphere it 
extended to harmful 
misuse and peaceful 
activities.
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73  Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009 of 5 May 2009, Article 2.1.
74  Quentin Michel, Sylvian Paile, Maryna Tsukanova, and Andrea Viski, Controlling the Trade of Dual-Use 
Goods- A Handbook, (Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2013), p. 79.
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of Regulation (EU) No. .../2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) 
No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of 
dual-use items. 
76  US Department of Commerce, “EAR – Part 730, General Information,” BIS, May 21, 2015.
77  86'HSDUWPHQWRI&RPPHUFH´($5²3DUW'HÀQLWLRQRIWHUPVµ%,60D\
78  In respect to life sciences research that have dual-use potential, it is useful to the present work to mention 
at least one reference to it made by an international instrument.
“Is There a Common Understanding of Dual-Use?: The Case of Cryptography” 119
79 80 81,82 83 
79  Cfr. Bert-Jaap, Koops, “Crypto Law Survey, Overview per country,” (February 2013), <www.cryptolaw.org>
80  Argentina has signed the Wassenaar Arrangement, so export controls should be regulated according to the 
pre-December 1998 Arrangement, including the General Software Note.
81  There are no import controls, but export is controlled along the Wassenaar model.
82  France has signed the Wassenaar Arrangement for export controls, with the exception of the (pre- December 
1998) General Software Note.
83  France used to restrict the domestic use and supply of cryptography for a long time. This restrictive 
legislation (authorization and declaration were required for almost all cryptography) was slightly liberalized 
since 1996.
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DOMESTIC LAWS  
AND REGULATIONS
Antigua and Barbuda X X X
Argentina80 O O
Australia X X X
Austria X X X
Bahrain X
Bangladesh O
Belarus X X X
Belgium X X X
Brazil O O
Bulgaria
Burma X X X
Cambodia O O
Canada X X O
Chile O O
People’s Republic of China X X X
Colombia O O
Costa Rica
Czech Republic X X O
Denmark X X O
Egypt X O
Estonia O X81
Finland O X X
France X X82 X83
Germany X X X
Ghana O O
Greece O X X
Hong Kong X X O84
Legend:    X = Yes;   O = No;   Blank = no reliable data source found 
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84 85
84  There are no regulations on the use of encryption. Crypto products that are to be connected to the public 
telecoms network, however, must comply with the relevant Telecommunications Authority’s network 
FRQQHFWLRQVSHFLÀFDWLRQV
85  When requested to provide information about its encryption laws, the government of the Democratic 






DOMESTIC LAWS  
AND REGULATIONS





Ireland O X X
Israel X X X
Italy X X X
Japan X O
Kazakhstan X X X
Kenya O O
Kyrgyzstan O
Latvia X X O
Lithuania X X O
Luxembourg X X O
Malaysia O O O
Mauritius O O O 
Mexico O O O 
Moldova X X O
Morocco X X X
Netherlands X X X
New Zealand X X O
North Korea85
Norway O X O 
Pakistan X
Peru O O O
Philippines O
Legend:    X = Yes;   O = No;   Blank = no reliable data source found 






DOMESTIC LAWS  
AND REGULATIONS
Poland X X O
Portugal X O




Saudi Arabia O O X
Singapore O X O
Slovakia X
Slovenia X
South Africa X86 X87 X
South Korea X X X
Spain X X
Sweden O X X




Trinidad & Tobago X
Tunisia X X
Turkey
Ukraine X X X
United Kingdom X X X




 86  8788 89 
86  There are import and export controls for military cryptography. Otherwise crypto import and export is free.
87  Use of encryption is free for commercial or private organizations.
88  $SDUWIURPWKHVHWZRVSHFLÀFUHJXODWLRQVWKHUHDUHQRGRPHVWLFFU\SWRUHJXODWLRQV
89  The US has signed the Wassenaar Arrangement, but does not implement the (pre-December 1998) General 
Software Note and generally maintains stricter controls.
Legend:    X = Yes;   O = No;   Blank = no reliable data source found 
Figure 2: Overview per Country of Cryptography Laws Continued
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